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In this paper, we enable the coexistence of multiple wireless body area networks (BANs) using a finite
repeated non-cooperative game for transmit power control. With no coordination amongst these personal
sensor networks, the proposed game maximizes each network’s packet delivery ratio (PDR) at low trans-
mit power. In this context we provide a novel utility function, which gives reduced benefit to players with
higher transmission power, and a subsequent reduction in radio interference to other coexisting BANs. Con-
sidering the purpose of inter-BAN interference mitigation, PDR is expressed as a compressed exponential
function of inverse signal-to-interference-and-noise ratio (SINR), so it is essentially a function of transmit
powers of all coexisting BANs. It is shown that a unique Nash Equilibrium (NE) exists, and hence there is
a subgame-perfect equilibrium, considering best-response at each stage independent of history. In addition,
the NE is proven to be the socially optimal solution across all action profiles. Realistic and extensive on-
and inter-body channel models are employed. Results confirm the effectiveness of the proposed scheme in
better interference management, greater reliability and reduced transmit power, when compared with other
schemes that can be applied in BANs.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Over the last decade, the urgent concerns for public health and physical well-being
has led to a dramatic development of various types of wearable technologies. Among
them, wireless body area networks (BANs), also known as wireless body sensor net-
works, are very promising because of their affordability, flexibility and convenience. A
typical BAN comprises several on-body or implanted sensors that monitor physiologi-
cal parameters and a gateway device, which is connected to the internet [Astrin et al.
2012]. In the medical domain, this architecture ensures the user’s information is kept
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up-to-date at their health services centre, which benefits comprehensive healthcare.
BANs are also used in areas such as consumer fitness, entertainment, gaming and the
military.
The increasing popularity of BAN has resulted in a rapid growth in active devices
in the last five years [Lewis 2008; ABIresearch 2011]. Considering the typical circum-
stance of using BANs, it is often necessary to have several BAN systems operating in
close proximity to each other. However, the transmission power of BAN sensor nodes is
strictly limited so as to prolong their operation life-time [Astrin et al. 2012], which how-
ever makes the system vulnerable to radio interference from other BANs. Therefore,
BANs coexistence and the resultant inter-BAN interference is a major issue, which
can cause severe performance degradation and packet loss as shown in [Deylami and
Jovanov 2012; Wang and Cai 2011; Martelli and Verdone 2012]. In addition, inter-BAN
interference is a cause of energy wastage of sensor nodes trying to compete for better
signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratios (SINRs).
There have been many studies on effective interference management schemes in
wireless networks [Douros and Polyzos 2011]. Many techniques involves transmission
power control that is based on a centralized [Zander 1992b; Wu 1999] and partially
distributed [Zander 1992a] approach. They are effective in the context of cellular net-
works and general large-scale ad-hoc networks [Lin et al. 2006] as these networks
have fewer resource constraints and a stabler network topology. However, these meth-
ods are difficult to apply to BANs due to their high mobility. In [Lee and Lin 1996] and
[Foschini and Miljanic 1993], fully distributed power control schemes were proposed,
which we refer to as SINR-balancing in this paper. SINR balancing works well for dis-
tributed cellular mobile systems, but their performance is unknown for BANs. More
recently, game-theoretic based resource allocation schemes have been widely proposed
for various types of wireless networks, from spectrum allocation [Candogan et al. 2010;
Seneviratne and Leung 2011] to transmit power control algorithms [Ozel and Uysal-
Biyikoglu 2009].
To better model the scenario of multiple BANs coexistence as shown in Fig.1 and con-
sidering the difficulty in finding a global coordinator among BANs, they are modeled as
rational players competing for resources (common channel) in a non-cooperative game.
We employ a local non-cooperative game-based power control scheme at each BAN. It
uses a novel price-dependent utility function to determine the next superframe’s trans-
mission power, which provides a unique Nash Equilibrium. As the IEEE 802.15.6 stan-
dard clearly specifies a maximum packet error rate of 10%, packet delivery ratio (PDR)
is used as the target utility. Hence, by maximizing the utility function, a higher PDR
can be achieved. The instantaneous PDR is expressed as a compressed exponential
function of SINR, which is essentially a function of all transmit powers of coexisting
BANs. Obviously, by raising its transmit power, a self-interested BAN can achieve a
better utility outcome if the other BANs keep their transmit powers unchanged. How-
ever, if every BANs in the range do so, both local and aggregate utilities get worse due
to larger interference experienced. Therefore, a proper pricing function is employed
to restrain this behavior by penalizing utilities of BANs with high transmit power. In
[Kazemi et al. 2010], Kazemi also presented an interference mitigation scheme using
game-based power control games for BANs with limited cooperation amongst networks
over static channels. In our work, the dynamic body movement and shadowing are
taken into consideration, which is typically experienced on BANs[Zhang et al. 2009;
Smith et al. 2009; Smith et al. 2011a; Cotton and Scanlon 2006], and no coordination
exists amongst networks.
This paper makes the following novel contributions:
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Fig. 1. Code before preprocessing.
— We introduce a non-cooperative game theoretic transmit power control scheme for
BANs to maximize the local packet delivery ratio across multiple BANs while reduc-
ing average transmit power.
— We model the packet delivery ratio of a typical BAN system in terms of instantaneous
SINR using a compressed exponential function.
— The performance of the proposed power control scheme is evaluated using realistic
on- and inter-body time-selective channel models, which is the typical operating en-
vironment for the BANs.
— The implementation of this game results in a unique Nash equilibrium that addi-
tionally provides a socially optimal outcome across all coexisting BANs.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, the details of the sys-
tem setup and channel models are explained. Section III defines the non-cooperative
game for multiple BANs coexistence, describes our novel utility function and shows
the unique Nash equilibrium, as well as the socially optimal outcome of the game. In
Section IV, the performance of this power control method is assessed and compare with
other schemes. Finally, in Section V some concluding remarks are made.
2. SYSTEM MODEL
2.1. Table of notations
Table I lists all symbols used in this paper.
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Table I. Notations used in this paper
Notation Meaning of the notation
Td Time length of superframe
Tidle,i Time length of the idle period between two consecutive superframes for BAN i
Tbeacon,i Time between two consecutive beacons for BAN i
Nc Number of orthogonal channels used in the inter-BAN TDMA scheme
M Total number of BANs coexisting in close proximity (including both active and idle BANs)
m Number of BANs transmitting concurrently
S, Sactive, Sidle Set of all coexisting BANs; Set of all BANs transmitting concurrently; Set of all idle BANs
pi, p−i Transmission power of a sensor in BAN i; Transmission power of all other active BANs except BAN i
Pmini , P
max
i Minimum and maximum transmission power of sensors in BAN i
hii On-body channel gain between sensor and hub in BAN i
hij Inter-body channel gain between sensor in BAN j and hub in BAN i
σ Average additive white Gaussian noise power
γi SINR over a packet received at the hub of BAN i
pdr Packet delivery rate
ac, bc, a, b Parameters of the SINR vs. PDR approximation and simplified approximation
disto, distij Reference distance; distance between subjects (BANs) i and j
(xi, yi) Coordinates of BAN i
U(·) Utility function of the proposed cooperative power control game
m∑
i=1
Ui(·) Social welfare
wi, vi, di Parameters of the utility function
2.2. BANs coexistence based on probability of overlapping
We consider multiple subjects in the proximity of each other, each wearing a typical
star-topology BAN. Time division multiple access (TDMA) is employed as the intra-
BAN access scheme. Here, the period of time, between hub broadcasting a beacon and
all sensors completing transmission in a round-robin fashion, is defined to be a su-
perframe Td. It is followed by an idle period Tdile, during which sensors are inactive
and waiting for next beacon. In terms of the inter-BAN access scheme, a unsynchro-
nized TDMA scheme is used as we assume no coordination exists amongst networks
[Zhang et al. 2010]. In this concept, the channel is temporally divided into Nc orthog-
onal channels (time slots) and each time slot has a length of Td. BAN i chooses its
transmission starting time of a superframe independently and randomly following a
uniform distribution over [0, (Nc − 1)Td].
Tbeacon,i = Td + Tidle,i, (1)
Pr(Tidle,i = t) =
{
1
(Nc−1)Td , t ∈ [0, (Nc − 1)Td]
0, t otherwise
, (2)
where Tbeacon,i is the time between two consecutive beacons from the hub of BAN i.
Here, we assume SM is the set of all M BANs located in close proximity, which consists
of a subset of all active BANs Sactive and a subset of all idle BANs Sidle.
S = Sactive ∪ Sidle, (3)
and |S| = |Sactive|+ |Sidle| =M.
where | · | represents the number of element in a set. Therefore, the probability of m
BANs transmitting concurrently Pr(|Sactive| = m) is calculated as follow:
Pr(|Sactive| = m) =
(
M
m
)(
2
Nc
)m(
1− 2
Nc
)M−m
, (4)
where m ∈ [1,M ], Nc ≥ 2
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Fig. 2. Multiple BANs coexistence probability
The probability of a BAN actively transmitting with respect to any other BANs is
2
Nc
due to the lack of synchronization of inter-BAN TDMA scheme. Fig.2 shows the
probability of m BANs transmitting concurrently with 8 BANs (M = 8) coexisting.
Different colors correspond to the varying number of orthogonal channels available.
In this study, the proposed power control game is simulated over many occasions with
different channels, wherein each occasion the value of m is chosen randomly following
the probability distribution {Pr(|Sactive| = m)}. By introducing this probability distri-
bution, it also models the mobility of BANs for multiple networks coexistence as BANs
can leave and also enter the area of interest.
2.3. SINR-based packet delivery ratio
At any time, a sensor in each BAN transmits concurrently with sensor nodes in other
m− 1 BANs. Hence, for each BAN, the hub receives not only the signal packet from its
own sensor node, but also m− 1 interfering signal packets. Therefore, the SINR over a
signal packet at the hub of BAN i, γi(τ), is calculated as follows:
γi(τ) =
pi(τ)|hii|2∑m
j=1,j 6=i pj(τ)|hij |2 + σ2
, (5)
where pi(τ) is the transmission power of a sensor in the ith BAN at time τ ; hij repre-
sents the average channel gain across a packet time from the sensor in BAN j to the
hub in BAN i, in other words, the interference channel from interferer j to network i.
In terms of hii, it is the average on-body channel gain from the sensor to its connected
hub in BAN i in the same time interval.
Observing that the graph of general PDR vs. SINR is a sigmoidal function, it is pos-
sible to express the PDR as a compressed exponential function of inverse SINR, 1/γ
[Smith et al. 2014]. In (6), γ is calculated as (5) and ac and bc are constant parameters
depends on particular modulation, coding scheme and packet length. Complying with
the IEEE 802.15.6 standard [Astrin et al. 2012], BCH(31,19) coding and DPSK/BPSK
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Table II. Estimated parameters in the compressed exponential
function (6) and its simplified form (7)
Modulation ac bc a b
DPSK 0.230 7.409 −337.2164 −7.4540
BPSK 0.293 6.358 −30.0512 −6.3470
modulation scheme are applied with a packet length of 256 bytes. It is found that
BCH(31,19) provides about 2 dB channel coding gain as shown in Fig.3, this advantage
is considered when estimating the PDR vs. SINR relation.1 With a root-mean-square
error of the approximation less than 0.006, Fig.4 shows the comparison between ap-
proximated and simulated PDR vs. SINR relation for DPSK and BPSK respectively.
For later simplicity of analysis, we can rearrange the equation to be expressed as (7),
where a = −(1/ac)bc and b = −bc. The values of a and b are given as in Table II for both
DPSK and BPSK.
pdr = exp
(
−
(
1
γac
))bc
(6)
= exp
(
aγb
)
, (7)
3. NON-COOPERATIVE POWER CONTROL GAME
3.1. Game Definition
In this multiple BANs coexistence game, each BAN network makes an independent
decision on the transmit power of the next packet based on its current SINR. Here
each BAN is treated as a player in a non-cooperative repeated game G = {N,P, U},
where:
1BCH(31,19) is used as an example here. There are other non-IEEE 802.15.6 compliant coding schemes
which can provide higher coding gain.
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Fig. 4. Simulated SINR vs. Approximated SINR
(1) N = {1, 2, ...,m} is a finite set of players whom indexed by i. N represents the same
set as Sactive;
(2) P represents the global strategy space, which is the Cartesian product of all play-
ers’ strategy spaces, i.e. P = P1 × P2 × ... × Pm. The pure strategy set of player
i, Pi, is a finite set of discrete transmit powers in the range of [Pmini , Pmaxi ]. The
action of player i at any time(stage) τ is denoted as pi(τ) ∈ Pi, and p−i stands for
the choice of transmission power of other players except player i;
(3) The utility function Ui is defined in terms of the current transmission power pi(τ)
and packet delivery ratio PDR. Its objective is to maximize the PDR while mini-
mizing the transmit power. It is defined as follow:
U(pi, pdri) = −pwii −
di
pdrvii
, (8)
where pdri is a function of SINR and thus a function of the transmit powers of all
players according to (6) and (5). Hence, U(pi, pdri) can be rearranged and expressed
as U(pi, p−i). The exponents vi > 0 and wi > 0 depend on the particular network
configuration, and can be varied accordingly. The weighting factor di > 0 can be
adjusted depending on the current network status. At the end of every time slot,
players (BANs) update their transmit power levels to maximize the outcome from
applying the utility function based on the latest transmit power and the current
SINR:
pi(τ + 1) = argmax(U(Pi, p−i)), (9)
where Pi = {pi|pi ∈ [Pmini , Pmaxi ]},∀i ∈ N
3.2. Nash Equilibrium
An important condition for the non-cooperative game to converge is that a unique Nash
Equilibrium (NE) exists. The existence and uniqueness of the Nash Equilibrium of the
defined game are proved as follow.
ACM Transactions on Sensor Networks, Vol. V, No. N, Article A, Publication date: January YYYY.
A:8
Definition 3.1. The action profile p∗ = (p∗1, p∗2, ..., p∗m) ∈ P is a Nash Equilibrium
if, for all players, p∗i is a best response to p−i∗. In the other words, there exists
Ui(p
∗
i ,p−i
∗) ≥ Ui(pi,p−i∗) for any choice of pi ∈ Pi.
THEOREM 3.2. At least one Nash Equilibrium exists for the non-cooperative finite
repeated game G = {N,P, U} proposed here.
PROOF.
(1) [Pmini , Pmaxi ] is a nonempty, convex and compact subspace of a Euclidean space Rm.
(2) The utility function (8) is continuous in the domain [Pmini , Pmaxi ]. This can be shown
by taking the first derivative of the utility function and substituting (7) and (5):
δUi
δpi
= −wipwi−1i +
divi
pdrvi+1i
δpdri
δpi
, (10)
= −wipwi−1i +
divi
pdrvi+1i
pdriabγ
b−1
i
δγi
δpi
, (11)
= −wipwi−1i + abγb−1i
divi
pdrvii
|hii(ki)|2
I−i
, (12)
where I−i is the interference and noise power experienced at the hub of player i.
Based on (5), we can derive the relation γipi =
|hii(ki)|2
I−i
. Therefore,
δUi
δpi
= −wipwi−1i + abγb−1i
divi
pdrvii
γi
pi
(13)
Since pi ∈ [Pmini , Pmaxi ] is real and pdri is non-zero according to the approxima-
tion shown in (7), the first derivative function is defined. Therefore, Theorem 1 is
proved.
THEOREM 3.3. The Nash Equilibrium at each stage in the non-cooperative power
control game G is unique, when di > 0. With the unique Nash equilibrium at each stage,
which is independent of history, there is a unique sub-game perfect equilibrium.
PROOF. To show the Nash Equilibrium point pi is unique in the range of
[Pmini , P
max
i ], it is sufficient to check the concavity of the utility function U(pi, pdri)
by taking the second derivative.
δ2Ui
δp2i
= −wi(wi − 1)pwi−2i + ci
γb−2i
pdrvi
{(b− 1)− abviγbi }; (14)
where ci = abdivi
|hii|4
I2−i
. Due to the fact that pi is always positive, the first part of (14)
has a negative value as long as the constraint of exponent wi >= 1 is satisfied. In
addition, since vi > 0, and a and b are both negative and SINR,ci and PDR are always
positive, the second part of (14) is always negative. The addition of these two parts
means the second derivative δ
2Ui
δp2i
< 0 in the range of [Pmini , Pmaxi ]. Therefore, the
function U(pi, pdri) is concave and has a local maximum at p∗i which occurs at the point
δU
δpi
= 0. In other words, the Nash Equilibrium at each stage of this game is unique.
Furthermore at any given stage, it can be seen that this equilibrium is independent of
the history, hence there is a sub-game perfect equilibrium.
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Fig. 5. Social welfare outcome of the game
3.3. Social Optimality and Pareto Optimality
As the existence and uniqueness of the Nash Equilibrium (NE) of the defined non-
cooperative game has been proved, the efficiency of operating at the NE now needs
to be determined. It should be noted that a NE, as per definition 3.1, is the best re-
sponse in a single player’s point of view, given the decisions of the other players. How-
ever, in the proposed non-cooperative game, there is imperfect information as the other
BANs’ transmit power for the current time slot is unknown. Therefore, it predicts other
BANs’ actions based on the latest aggregate interference power received. Additionally,
as players in the game act in their own self interest, there is no guarantee that the
decision is optimal from a social point of view, or even from an individual BAN’s per-
spective. Therefore, the efficiency of the NE solution is characterized as follows:
Definition 3.4. A joint action profile p∗ = (p∗1, p∗2, ..., p∗m) ∈ P is a socially optimal
(efficient) outcome if there is no other joint action profile p such that
m∑
i=1
Ui(pi,p−i) ≥
m∑
i=1
Ui(p
∗
i ,p
∗
−i).
In Definition 3.4,
m∑
i=1
Ui(pi,p−i) is the social welfare of the game. As p∗ leads to the
maximal social welfare, it is socially optimum and therefore is also Pareto efficient
[Bemporad et al. 2010]. In this paper, we would like to show that the action profile
p∗ = (p∗1, p
∗
2, ..., p
∗
m) at the NE point is indeed socially optimal. This can be observed
by comparing the social welfare, i.e. aggregate utility outcome of (8), obtained with all
different action profiles p ∈ {P = P1 ×P2 × ...×Pm}.
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PROPOSITION 3.5. When all BANs are operating at the unique Nash equilibrium
shown in Theorem 3.3, then according to Definition 3.4 the outcome of the proposed
power control game is socially optimal.
PROOF. Following (8), it may appear that the maximum social welfare that the
game can achieve is when all BANs transmit at the lowest power, i.e. −30dBm, and
meanwhile achieve a PDR of 1. However, due to the on-body channel attenuation and
inter-BAN interference, it is generally impossible to achieve this. With exhausted com-
paring among all possible action profiles p at each time slot, the maximum possible
social welfare is plotted as the black dashed line in Fig.5. It matches the social welfare
reached with actual action profile p∗ determined at the unique NE, which is indicated
as red dots in Fig.5. Additionally, Fig.5 also shows the social welfare of a large agglom-
erate of randomly sampled action profiles in the blue shaded area, which are all below
the actual social welfare of the game. It is noted that the aggregate utility achieved
at time slot 0 is not the optimal social welfare, since the initial transmit power of all
BANs are randomly chosen in the range of [−30, 0] dBm. According to all possible ob-
servations, the Nash Equilibrium is therefore socially optimal, and hence also Pareto
optimal.
3.4. Algorithm Description
In this section, an iterative and distributed power control game that determines each
BAN’s transmission power at time τ is described as in Alg.1.
ALGORITHM 1: The proposed distributed non-cooperative power control game
(1) In BAN i, a sensor transmits a packet with pi(τ). When τ = 0, pi(0) ∈ [Pmini , Pmaxi ] is
randomly chosen. If τ > 0, pi(τ − 1) is determined in the previous iteration at τ − 1;
(2) Hub in BAN i (i ∈ N ) calculates the SINR γi(τ) of the received packet as (5);
(3) Estimate the instantaneous PDR pdri(τ) with γi(τ) based on the PDR vs. SINR
approximation (7);
(4) As (9),determine the transmission power at τ + 1, pi(τ + 1) ∈ [Pmini , Pmaxi ], which gives the
maximum value of U(pi, pdri(τ));
4. CHANNEL MODEL
To evaluate the performance of the proposed game-based power control algorithm, ex-
tensive on- and inter-body channels are modeled. We simulate the scenarios in which
a random number of BANs are coexisting and moving in arbitrary directions. Since
the same network topology is used in each BAN, it is a reasonable assumption that on-
body channels are independent and identically distributed for all players. The gamma
distribution can characterize the general everyday on-body channel of a BAN [Smith
et al. 2011a], so gamma fading with a mean 60 dB attenuation, with shape parameter
of 1.31, and scale parameter of 0.562, which considers the effect of body shadowing and
BAN channel dynamics, is employed.
In terms of the inter-body interfering channel, we start with representing the move-
ment of a player by a series of (x(τ), y(τ)) coordinates updated every 1 ms. The initial
positions of players are randomly chosen within a 6 × 6m2 square area which corre-
sponds to the requirements in the standard [Astrin et al. 2012]. During their move-
ment, a random small turning angle is introduced to model a realistic walking pattern
of an individual. In addition, an average walking speed of 3m/s with 0.2m/s standard
deviation is applied. This walking model enables us to calculate the distance between
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two players i and j at any instant throughout the simulation. The channel attenua-
tion is then calculated based on path loss model, body shadowing and also small scale
fading,
hji = At(dist0/distij)
(2.7/2)ABSASC , (15)
assuming a path loss exponent of 2.7 between BANs2. distij represents the distance
between players i and j, and the reference distance dist0 = 5m corresponds to a chan-
nel attenuation At of 54 dB. We consider the average case where body shadowing
contributes approximately ABS = 45 dB attenuation and adopt a Jakes’ model with
Doppler spread of 1.1 Hz as the Rayleigh distribution for the small scale fading ASC
between BANs.
5. SIMULATION ANALYSIS
One individual repeated game consists of 100 repeated game-playing stages. 20 sets of
channels are generated based on the description in Section 4. Because of the random
moving velocity, the walking pattern varies between different channel model sets. With
each set, the same 100-stage game is played on 50 occasions, using different segments
of the data. Therefore, a total of 1000 games, each with 100 stages, are conducted.
Here, a maximum of 8 BAN networks locating in the vicinity is simulated, i.e. M = 8
in (4). At any time during the simulation, a various number of BANs are active with
the others idle. The actual number of networks transmitting concurrently follows the
probability distribution Pm described in (4). The case of m = 0 is neglected as the case
of no network transmitting is irrelevant. In terms of inter-BAN TDMA scheme, we
assume 4 orthogonal channels (Nc = 4) are used. In addition, to investigate the effect
of a given number of coexisting BANs on the performance of the proposed algorithm,
constant numbers of BANs coexisting are also simulated, with the number coexisting
from 2 to 8 each run on 1000 occasions. The exponents in the utility function v and w
are set to be 4 and 1, which give the best outcomes for the game.
Based on the same configuration and channel models, we compare the proposed
game with some other schemes commonly applied in BAN. The comparison is based
on two criteria – (i) percentage of BANs reaching the target PDR; and (ii) transmis-
sion power at each stage. The result is averaged across all 1000 games. Complying to
the IEEE 802.15.6 standard [Astrin et al. 2012], the target PDR is set to be 0.9. The
rest of the schemes are Sample-and-Hold[Smith et al. 2011b; Dong and Smith 2014],
SINR-Balancing[Foschini and Miljanic 1993][Lee and Lin 1996] and constant trans-
mission power at 0/−5/−10 dBm. Here in Sample-and-Hold current SINR is used for
each BAN to set its’ next transmission power, unlike in [Dong and Smith 2014], where
it is done with respect to channel gain. Here in Sample-and-Hold the transmission
power is adjusted based on the latest packet’s SINR to attempt to achieve the target
SINR for the next packet.
All power control methods are applied and plotted in Fig.6 and 7, using BPSK and
DPSK modulations respectively for the case where number of concurrently transmit-
ting BANs follows the probability distribution Pm (4). From Fig.6(a), it is shown that
using the proposed game-based power control method, approximately 93% of the BANs
are able to achieve the target PDR of 0.9 while this number is only 80% and 77% for
Sample-and-Hold and SINR-balancing methods. Constant transmission at different
power level shows similar performance to each other with about 87% achieving target
PDR. In terms of the time taken to converge to the steady-state minimized transmit
power, the proposed method and Sample-and-hold achieve this 16 time slots ahead of
2Although other common path loss exponents ≥ 2 for the environments in which BANs are co-located are
equally applicable.
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Fig. 6. BPSK Simulation results
SINR-balancing. The short convergence time of the first two algorithms ensures that
they can quickly respond to time-variations in the target channel and also interfer-
ence, which is typical for BAN operation. In terms of the output transmit power shown
in Fig.6(b), the game has an average of −25 dBm while sample-and-hold is about −23
dBm. SINR-balancing has 2 dB less in average transmission power compared with our
proposed method. However, with its poor performance in percentage of BANs reach-
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Fig. 7. DPSK Simulation results
ing the target and slow response time, it is not a suitable choice for enabling BANs
coexistence. Further the game has at least 15 dB less average transmit power than
the constant power transmission. Similar output transmit powers can be observed in
Fig.7(a) when DPSK is employed. In this case, the percentage of BANs reaching the
target PDR is 92%, 85%, 76% and 74% for the proposed algorithm, constant power
transmission, Sample-and-Hold and SINR-balancing respectively.
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Fig. 8. Different number of BANs coexisting scenarios
Next we show the effect of changing the number of players on the performance of
the proposed power control game. Fig.8 shows the comparison when the number m of
coexisting BANs is fixed, m ∈ [2, 8], with respect to the previous criteria. The same
simulation parameters (exponents v = 4 and w = 1, weighting factor calculation di)
are used for different values of m. It is observed that the average percentage of BANs
reaching the target PDR of 0.9 decreases with increasing m, from 97% to 83%. In
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Fig.8(a), the intercept point of the red broken line and each solid line indicates the
approximate time slot for game convergence, which shows that the more players that
join the game the longer it takes for the game to converge. In Fig.8(b), we can see
that transmit power rises from −27 dBm to −21 dBm as m increases from 2 to 8.
Note that the performance of the proposed algorithm for different values of m always
outperforms any of the previously described schemes described previously in the case
of the average percentage of BANs reaching the target. Although SINR balancing uses
slightly smaller transmit power it sacrifices a lot in terms of reliability.
6. CONCLUSION
Wireless Body Area Networks (BANs) have been pervasively used in many areas. For
these personal sensor networks, with no global coordination amongst multiple closely-
located networks, there can be severe performance degradation. For better interference
management, a non-cooperative power control game has been proposed, to enable coex-
istence amongst BANs. In this game, a novel utility function , which constrains output
transmit power is applied for each player. The unique Nash Equilibrium, which is also
a socially optimal solution, and sub-game perfect equilibrium leads to a converged out-
come after a small number of stages, in terms of all BANs reaching target packet de-
livery ratio at the lowest possible transmit power. Based on extensive simulation over
different instantiations of a realistic channel model, our proposed scheme can achieve
a significantly higher number of BANs more rapidly reaching target PDR than other
power control methods that are typically employed in distributed wireless networks.
In addition, the lower circuit power consumption as result of lower transmit power
using the proposed game, can significantly prolong the lifetime of the battery of the
sensor radio. Finally, increasing the number of coexisting BANs only degrades the per-
formance of the proposed power control game by a small amount, still outperforming
other feasible methods.
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